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Stephen Munzer*
The doctrine that valid legal rules cannot conflict has not received
the direct and detailed consideration it merits. Even those who have
defended the doctrine have not laid entirely bare their disposition
to embrace it. Some of the arguments presented in its defense reflect
the belief that conflict between valid rules would amount to logical
contradiction; others seem to assume that the notion of legal obli-
gation associated with the concept of validity is conclusive and pre-
cludes the existence of two conflicting valid rules applicable to the
same situation. However, more explicit investigation of the question
whether two valid legal rules can conflict is in order. For it does not
reduce to the often simple and tedious problem of whether a certain
concept applies to a given item or situation. It rather goes to the
root of our understanding of legal validity and of its relation to legal
obligation.
My object in this article is to show the doctrine that valid rules
cannot conflict to be false. I shall argue that neither the concept
of validity itself nor any other factor excludes such conflict. The de-
ployment of my argument first requires, however, an analysis of what
it means for two rules to conflict.
I. The Nature and Types of Legal Conflict
Several problems relating to individuation, though of great interest
and importance, are essentially irrelevant to the present discussion
and will be put to one side. Legal philosophers have long been en-
gaged in the attempt to show how the content of a legal system should
be individuated, i.e., divided into smaller units of legal material, which
they have variously called "commands," "rules," "norms," "laws,"
"principles," "policies," and so on. The first of the problems to be
set aside is whether the elements of a legal system may include items
between which conflict would uniformly be regarded as innocuous.
Under at least one interpretation of The Concept of Law, H. L. A.
Hart includes only duty-imposing and power-conferring rules in the
inventory of a modem legal system, and most would find conflict
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between such rules to be troubling. In contrast, Ronald Dworkin
contends that a legal system also includes elements, which he calls
"principles" and "policies," that plainly can "intersect" or conflict.'
I shall confine my discussion to conflicts between "legal rules." The
second problem to be distinguished is the proper individuation of
items between which the possibility of conflict is deemed a matter of
concern. So, for example, Hans Kelsen divides the content of legal
systems into "norms" which direct officials to impose sanctions upon
the satisfaction of certain conditions, and no conflict among such norms
is admitted to be possible.2 Joseph Raz, on the other hand, categorizes
a number of different types of "laws," between which conflict is pos-
sible but also (at least usually) resolvable within the system. 3 Any
theory of individuation that allows for conflicts which other portions
of the system are competent to resolve must show such conflicts to
be compatible with the concept of validity. In this essay, however, I
shall focus on the more difficult and fundamental problem of whether
conflicts can occur between "legal rules" that are not resolvable within
the legal system. I would emphasize that I am not committing myself
to any particular doctrine of individuation. The various sorts of con-
flict I shall identify can, if perhaps more ponderously, be expressed
under other theories of individuation.
For the purposes of this article I shall distinguish between legal
rules that impose duties and those that grant permissions. "Duty-im-
posing" rules subject someone to a legal duty or obligation. A full
statement of such a rule specifies some person or class of persons (the
"norm-subject"), some act or type of act (the "norm-act"), and the
circumstances in which the rule applies (the "conditions of applica-
tion"),4 and indicates whether in those circumstances the norm.subject
is to perform, or to forbear performing, the norm-act. "Permission-
granting" or "permissive" rules indicate that in certain circumstances
the norm-subject is allowed to perform, or to abstain from perform-
ing, the norm-act. Pernissive rules do not on this account include
1. The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1967). reprinted under the title Is Law
a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS iN LEGAL PIIILOSOPitY 25, 39 (R. Summers ed. 1968) [herein-
after cited as Dworkin, The Model of Rules, with page references to the reprinted article].
See also Dworkin, Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine, in ETnuCS AND SOCtAL JUs'ncE
200, 202 (H. Kiefer & M. Munitz eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin, Comments on
the Unity of Law Doctrine]; Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YAIE L.J. 855.,
882-88 (1972).
2. See H. KELsFsa, GENERAL THEoRY OF Lw AND STATE (1945); H. KELSE:N, PuRE TroaY
OF LAw (M. Knight transl. 1967).
3. See J. RAz, THE CoNcEPT OF A LEGAL SvIsT-. (1970); and, more recently, Raz, Legal
Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 Y.LE L.J. 823 (1972).
4. This terminology is derived from G.H. vo.N WRiGirr, Nopt AND .\cno% 70-92 (1963).
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"bare" permissions, i.e., those situations in which the law is silent and
hence there is simply an absence of a legal duty. I make this exclu-
sion because it is a mistake to speak of a rule conflicting with a bare
permission.5 I am concerned here only with "explicit" permissions.
These may be created in situations where the law states expressly
that an act, though presently neither prohibited nor required, may be
performed or that its non-performance is allowed; or where the law
terminates an existing obligation; or (at least usually) where the law
establishes certain formalities that must be complied with if certain
consequences it wishes as a general matter to facilitate, or make
room for, are to result.0 While these examples may not be exhaustive
and do not in any case provide a rigorous account of the difference
between bare and explicit permissions, they are sufficient to prepare
us for the main question.
That question is: "What is it for two rules to conflict?" If we re-
strict attention to situations involving two rules, an answer to this
question must deal with three different combination-types or cases.
(i) Two duty-imposing rules may require and forbid the same action
by the same person at the same time. For example, one rule may re-
quire all doctors to treat persons found injured on the roadway, while
another rule may prohibit them from doing so. (ii) A rule may impose
a duty on certain persons to act (not to act) at a certain time, while
another rule may permit such persons not to act (to act) at that time.
Thus one rule may prohibit all doctors from treating persons found
injured on the roadway, while another may permit them to do so.
(iii) A rule may allow certain persons to act at a certain time, and
another may allow them not to act in that way at that time. For
instance, a rule may allow doctors to treat persons found injured on
the roadway, while another rule may permit them not to treat such
persons.
An agreeably simple answer-and one that has enjoyed some favor
in the literature-to the question posed would find conflict when
and only when joint (simultaneous) conformity to two rules having
5. See note 13 infra.
6. It must be emphasized that the law is in this last situation doing a very great deal
besides, as the various discussions of legal powers show. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, TlE
CONCEPT OF LAW 27-41, 78-79, 238-39 (1961); 1. RAZ. supra note 3, at 162.66, 181-83;
Hart, Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 YALE L.J. 799 (1972). I do not wish to attempt here
a proper analysis of those rare cases in which the law confers a power to perform an
act it seems to forbid, e.g., where as in some legal systems it sometimes grants a thief
the power to make a valid transfer of stolen property even though he commits an offense
in doing so.
7. See, e.g., Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ETHICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
171, 183-85 (H. Kiefer & M. Munitz eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
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the same norm-subject is logically impossible. This theory of the na-
ture of conflict seems to deal tolerably well with case (i). For each
duty-imposing rule we may frame an indicative statement ("conformi-
ty statement")-e.g., "Doctor X treated injured person Y on the road-
way" and "Doctor X did not treat injured person Y on the roadway."
The duty-imposing rules in question would conflict because it is
logically impossible that both conformity statements, on the assump-
tion that the same persons and occasion are being referred to, could
be true." Finding conflict to be present in cases of type (i) seems to
accord with our ordinary intuitions as to when a conflict exists. But
the joint conformity theory deals very awkwardly, if at all, with cases
(ii) and (iii). If one "conforms" to a permissive rule by doing what
it allows,9 joint conformity is in these cases logically impossible, and,
if we adhere to the theory, we must say that a conflict exists. Now in
case (ii) we might be willing to apply the word "conflict" if the norm-
subject acted on the permissive rule; for he would then have violated
a duty-imposing rule. But if the norm-subject discharged his obliga-
tion under the duty-imposing rule, we would usually be reluctant to
say that he was in a situation of "conflict" merely because he did not
simultaneously act on the permissive rule. So far as cases of type (iii)
are concerned, our inclination would be to say, at least as to the ex-
ample introduced in the preceding paragraph, that the two permissive
rules do not conflict at all. Yet the joint conformity theory would
commit us to precisely the opposite conclusion. One could complicate
the theory by stipulating that the joint conformity test simply does
not apply to cases of type (iii) and that permissive rules cannot ever
conflict.10 But this is merely an ad hoc restriction imposed to salvage
the plausibility of the theory. And it prevents us from acknowledging
the presence of conflict in certain more complex instances of type
(iii)-a point to which I shall later return.
The source of all these difficulties with the joint conformity theory
is that it neglects to distinguish separate questions and confusedly at-
8. It is essential to distinguish sharply the question whether two conformity state-
ments are logically inconsistent from the question whether two conflicting niles are so.
Conformity statements are assertions as to what is or has been the case. and accordingly
their consistency or inconsistency is a matter of "indicative" logic. Rules. on the other
hand, are concerned with what is obligatory or permitted, and their consistency or in-
consistency is the province of "deontic' logic. See note 62 infra.
9. Since the word "conformity" is normally restricted to doing what a rule imposing
an obligation requires, an extension of the term is involved in using it also to charac-
terize acting on or availing oneself of a permission, i.e., doing what a permissive rule
allows. This should occasion no difficulty so long as it is remembered that I am using
the word in this special sense, because my arguments will not depend on the ordinary
language characteristics of such words as "conformity" or "compliance."
10. This is the move made by Hart, supra note 7, at 185 nA3 (198).
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tempts to respond to them all in terms of a single principle. The
sentence "What is it for two rules to conflict?" has the form of a
single question. Without attempting to sort out all the different
queries it raises, I would suggest that at least two closely related but
nonetheless distinguishable questions should be separated: (a) "What
is it for two rules to conflict in themselves, i.e., apart from any given
norm-subject's complying with or acting on them, or his failing to
do so?" (b) "What is it for two rules to conflict on a particular occa-
sion by virtue of an act or omission by a norm-subject?" This dis-
tinction sometimes figures, though perhaps not explicitly, in non-
technical discussions of the law or a person's legal position. At times,
for instance, we focus on the language of two legislative enactments
and attempt to decide whether there is some incompatibility between
them. At other times, however, we ask whether on a particular oc-
casion a person violated one rule when he satisfied an obligation or
availed himself of a permission created by another rule.
How should these separate questions be answered? That two rules
conflict in themselves does require that joint conformity to both is
logically impossible. But it also requires, I believe, that on at least
some particular occasion, by performing or omitting the norm-act, the
rules might conflict. I include this second requirement because it
would be idle and highly unusual, though perhaps not meaningless,
to say that two rules conflict-even in themselves-when there cannot
be at least one norm-subject put into some sort of quandary by the
coexistence of the rules. Cases (i), (ii) and (iii) all plainly meet the
first requirement. Cases (i) and (ii) also clearly satisfy the second. In
case (i), the performance of one obligation by the norm-subject is ipso
facto a failure to perform a competing obligation. In case (ii), con-
flict on a particular occasion will exist (at least) when the norm-sub-
ject violates the duty-imposing rule by acting on the permission.
Whether situations in case (iii) can ever give rise to a conflict on a
particular occasion is a closer question which can be dealt with only
after a more thorough analysis of conflict on a particular occasion.
That two rules conflict on a particular occasion by virtue of an
act or omission by a norm-subject presupposes that joint conformity
to those rules is logically impossible. But it also requires that on that
occasion the rules clash or collide. The notion of clash or collision
is in this context metaphorical, but it suggests the idea of sharp dis-
agreement or opposition implicit in the etymology of "conflict.""
11. The word is derived from the Latin verb confligere, meaning "to strike together,
clash, conflict, contend, fight."
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The words "clash" and "collision"-which I shall use interchangeably
-are meant to capture this idea of sharp disagreement or opposition
and of the quandary in which norm-subjects are placed by rules re-
quiring or allowing incompatible courses of behavior. To be somewhat
more specific, two rules clash or collide if, and only if, any act
or omission of the norm-act type figuring in the rules violates, or
results in the violation of, a duty-imposing rule or some strong and
intimately connected pressure or policy in favor of a permissive rule.
Consider the examples introduced earlier. Case (i) will present a
conflict on every occasion involving a norm-subject for whom the con-
ditions of application are satisfied. For any act or omission of the
type in question, e.g., treating an injured person on the roadway,
would violate one rule or the other.12 Case (ii) is more complicated.
Now if the norm-subject avails himself of the permission, e.g., by
treating an injured person on the roadway, there is surely a conflict
on that occasion, since he thereby violates the duty-imposing rule.13
Normally, no conflict will exist on any occasion when the norm-subject
discharges the obligation imposed by the duty-imposing rule and
simply declines to act on the permissive rule. But the answer may
be different if there is a strong pressure or policy, intimately related
to the permission, for the norm-subject to avail himself of the per-
mission. Suppose that we alter the example originally introduced for
type (ii) combinations so that one rule prohibits doctors from treating
patients found injured on the roadway and another permits such
treatment. Suppose that neglecting to treat such persons is a hideous
violation of professional ethics, accepted morality, and express public
policy to reduce roadway deaths. Assume further that the permission
to treat such persons is corroborated by the law in various ways, e.g.,
by depriving one treated of the right to sue for battery, by setting a
12. This holds, at any rate, so long as the rules are not logically defcctive in their
formulation. In other words, the statement in the text should prove true unless the
norm-subject is a null class, the nonn-act is not in fact an act, the conlditions of ap-
plication can logically never be satisfied, or some logical inconsistency exists in the
characterization of these elements. This qualification also applies to the other two t~pes
of conflict identified.
13. It should now be clear why permissive rules cannot in this context be understood
to include bare as well as explicit permissions. Suppose that at one time a country had
no law relating to alcoholic beverages, but later prohibited their manufacture and sale.
If the initial bare permission is considered the product of a permissive rule, that rule and
the subsequent duty-imposing rule conflict in themselves, and the) conflict on a par-
ticular occasion whenever anyone acts on the permission by manufacturing or selling
alcoholic beverages. But it would be grotesque to describe this situation as a conflict,
and I cannot imagine that anyone would do so. Even if one were to resort to some
reconciliative mechanism, such as lex posterior derogat priori, the distortion would
not be eliminated. For no one would say that there existed some prior law (the bare
permission) which needed to be repealed by the subsequent prolubition in order to
resolve a conflict
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lower standard of professional care for such treatment, or even by
offering physicians some reward for saving injured persons. In this
case, I think it is accurate to say that the rules "clash" or "collide"
even when the norm-subject does not act on the permission. Certainly,
on such an occasion the norm-subject is put in a quandary, created
by general and strong principles of social responsibility, quite dif-
ferent from the mere bafflement he might feel if simultaneously for-
bidden and permitted to do an act that neither law nor society seeks
to promote.' 4
Case (iii) raises still more complex issues. The suggestion that per-
missive rules can conflict at all may seem dubious. The doubt is in-
deed well-founded where the element of clash or collision can never
be present and hence there can be no conflict on any particular oc-
casion. For example, joint conformity to the rules "All passengers
may board one hour prior to departure" and "All passengers may
abstain from boarding one hour prior to departure" is logically im-
possible. 15 But these rules can never clash. Any passenger may act
on either of these permissions without difficulty and without violating
any obligation. Since these rules can never conflict on a particular
occasion, it would be idle and counter-intuitive to suggest that they
even conflict in themselves. Nevertheless, there are perhaps two re-
stricted sets of cases that do involve conflict. The first, an analogy
with certain type (ii) conflicts just discussed, consists of instances in
which the norm-subject acts on one permission and thereby fails to
act on a different permission which is backed by a strong, intimately
related pressure or policy. The second set consists of cases in which
both permissions are acted on and thereby produce a conflict of either
of the first two types. Hence, a rule permitting a legislature or judge
to lay down a rule requiring certain persons to file a United States
income tax return and a second rule permitting them to lay down
a rule requiring or permitting said persons not to file would be in
14. If I understand him correctly, Dworkin seems to allow that it may sometimes be
realistic to describe two rules as conflicting if one forbids what another permits, though
he plainly thinks it would be bizarre to do so in many cases. He does not, however, focus
clearly and consistently on the difference between whether two rules conflict in them-
selves and whether they do so on a particular occasion. Moreover, his examples are drawn
chiefly from the conflict of laws; this introduces complexities as to jurisdiction and de-
ciding which rule to apply that I have thought it better to avoid. The relation of
Dworkin's views to the account offered in the text is thus not entirely clear. See Dworkin,
Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine, supra note 1, at 203-05.
15. For convenience I shall construe these sentences as stating two separate pernis-
sive rules, rather than a single rule that passengers may board one hour prior to de-
parture or not as they please. This construction may have the advantage of being more
accurate in those cases where explicit permissions to do and to omit doing a certain
act are granted at different times, or by different law-creating authorities, or both,
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conflict if the rules created were themselves in conflict or brought
into conflict.16 In other words, taking advantage of both permissive
rules by a legislature or judge would result in the violation by tax-
payers of a duty-imposing rule or of some pressure or policy that
favors acting on a permission. The two permissive rules would con-
flict in themselves because joint conformity to them is logically im-
possible and on at least some particular occasions they would conflict.
Those occasions would be when the rules collide by virtue of the
collision of rules they in turn create. Here a clash exists since the
incompatibility latent in the two permissive rules has been triggered
or brought to the surface. Joint conformity to these two permissive
rules is, of course, no more possible than to the two passenger-boarding
rules described earlier. A salient difference, however, exists between
these two pairs of rules. The same passengers availing themselves of
different rules at different times, or different passengers availing them-
selves of different rules at the same or different times, does not result
in the creation of new rules. By contrast, new rules are created when,
mutatis mutandis, the norm-subjects of the rules relating to laying
down requirements as to tax returns take advantage of them in these
ways. Indeed, if they did not take advantage of them in some such
ways, no conflicting rules could be created in this case. Some justi-
fication for considering these cases as instances of conflict lies in the
way we think about the law. If two duty-imposing rules or a duty-
imposing and a permissive rule conflict, we seek an explanation in
terms of the process which led to their existence. An explanation can
at least sometimes be given by reference to rules which permitted the
conflicting rules to be created. Although two permissive rules can
plainly be analyzed as a source of conflicting rules, this does not pre-
clude our regarding them also as a special type of conflict.
I should not like here to press further my sense that some sorts of
permissive rules can conflict. The matter clearly requires further
analysis. Quite beyond the issue of conflicts between permissive rules,
a fully adequate theory of legal conflict must deal with many ques-
tions I have had to ignore. To what situations would speakers of
English apply the term "legal conflict"? Would consideration of the
cases and literature in the discipline known as the conflict of laws
16. The relatively simplified manner in which I have described this situation is
adequate for present purposes, but it will often be important to distinguish betwccn
"permissions" and "authorizations:' and to frame an example more carefully in observ-
ance of the difference between legality/illegality on the one hand and validity/invalidity
on the other. On the latter point, see Hart, Benthaam on Legal Powers, 81 YALE L.J.
799, 816 (1972).
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shed further light on the nature of legal conflict? Can an account
of the sort offered here deal adequately with all varieties of condi-
tional obligations and conditional permissions? Would it be useful
to distinguish between "partial" and "total" legal conflicts? To the
extent that the notion of impossibility is involved, should we make
reference only to what is logically impossible? Or should we also in-
clude cases of "causal impossibility," e.g., where there are obligations
to do A and not to do B, yet A causes B, or "financial impossibility,"
e.g., where there are obligations to do A and to do B, but no one
has sufficient funds to do both?
If I ignore these questions here it is not because I think them
uninteresting or unimportant. So as not to leave the reader guessing
at what I mean by "legal conflict," I have attempted to provide a
substantial, though not complete, theory of the nature and types of
legal conflict. The argument presented in the remainder of this ar-
ticle holds, however, for any reasonable explanation of legal conflict,
and for simplicity's sake I shall just speak of legal conflict and not
distinguish between conflicts in themselves and conflicts on a par-
ticular occasion.
II. Legal Conflicts and the Concept of Validity
Is the concept of legal validity such as to insure that conflicts
between valid legal rules will never occur? Of course the term "legal
validity" has had different meanings for different writers. I shall at-
tempt to show that a concept of legal validity which does not pre-
clude the possibility of conflict is .to be preferred.
A. Validity as Legal Strength or Adequacy
A theory of validity, so far as analytical jurisprudence is concerned,
should illuminate in a clear and coherent way the concept of validity
actually found and used in the law. This does not mean that it must
parrot what judges, lawyers, legal writers, and others say about the
concept of validity. For they may not be wholly consistent 17 or pro-
vide the full, rigorous elaboration of the concept that the legal theorist
seeks. But it does mean that their use of this concept is of central im-
portance. An account of validity should be accepted only if it il-
luminates the practical employment of the concept and assists our
theoretical understanding of it and of related areas of legal thought.
17. In this connection, see note 38 infra.
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I have attempted elsewhere to provide a satisfactory theoretical anal-
ysis of the notibn of validity used by lawyers and others.18 I suggested
that when we say a rule is "valid" we mean that it is "legally strong
or adequate," "good or sufficient in point of law." Apart from what
might be called the meaning (in the strict sense of synonymy) of
"valid" and "validity," the statement that something is legally valid
entails that if applicable it may not legally be ignored or overthrown,
i.e., it would be a violation of a legal duty or obligation to do so.
For example, if a will is valid, a court may not ignore it and proceed
as if the testator had died intestate, but rather must see that within
certain limits his instructions are followed. A distinct but related
point is that a rule or act in the law or legal instrument will be
valid if, and only if, it satisfies criteria established by other rules
of the system. Thus to be valid, a legal rule, for example, must or-
dinarily be issued or enacted by an authority which has the legal
competence to do so, this authority must follow the required pro-
cedures for such issue or enactment, and the resulting rule must not
conflict with more authoritative rules, e.g., those contained in a writ-
ten constitution. This general account of legal validity is applicable
at least to legal rules, acts in the law, and legal instruments.
Two aspects of this theory of legal validity merit further comment.
On the one hand, validity is a formal notion: The law sets criteria that
particular legal rules, acts in the law, and legal instruments must
satisfy in order to be valid. On the other, validity is also a norma-
tive concept. The words "valid" and "validity," at least as often used
by those subject to a legal system, function in part as terms of nor-
mative appraisal. If something is valid, it is seen to have certain
normative consequences. On one level, these consequences apply to
those who are immediately subject to or affected by, say, a valid legal
rule. It is for this reason that lawyers and judges as well as legal
theorists speak of valid rules of obligation as having "binding force"
on those whose behavior they regulate. For a similar reason valid
rules that confer powers are considered to have certain normative
effects if the appropriate persons take advantage of them. On a second
level, these normative consequences also apply to legal officials. Either
as part of something implicit in valid rules themselves, or as the re-
sult of some general provision of the legal system, we consider that
18. See S. MUNZER, LEGAL VALIDITY 37-42 (1972). Whether valid rules can conflict was
not considered in my monograph, and further analysis of the nature of validity has
been necessary to deal with this question. Only the present paragraph in the zext rep-
resents a summary of my earlier investigations.
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legal officials must apply all and only valid rules in the appropriate
circumstances. They have a legal duty not to ignore behavior that
fails to conform to valid duty-imposing rules and not to fail to give
effect to actions performed in accordance with valid power-conferring
rules. Hence, employment of the concept of legal validity simul-
taneously looks backward to formal criteria a rule must meet to be
valid and forward to the application of a given rule and its attendant
normative consequences.
But what is the force of "legal duty" or "legal obligation" here? If
a rule is valid and applicable in a certain situation, is this conclu-
sive, i.e., does a judge or other legal official have an absolute obli-
gation to apply it, which no other considerations can defeat? Or does
he have only a prima facie obligation to apply the rule, an obligation
that can be overridden in certain circumstances? It seems to me that
he has only a prima facie obligation. Usually, of course, if a valid
rule is applicable there is no further question as to whether a judge
must actually apply it.19 But what is usually so is not what is always
or necessarily so. There seem to me several situations where we might
say that this obligation can be overridden. One, as I shall argue more
fully below, is where two valid rules conflict. For if a legal official
has an absolute duty to apply two conflicting valid rules, then the
system has in effect put him in a position where he must violate
one duty or the other-and this seems intuitively unacceptable. A
second case is where the appropriate criteria of validity are satisfied,
but, though there is no conflict, considerations militate against ap-
plying the rule. If these considerations are extremely powerful, they
may be sufficient to override the official's prima facie obligation to
apply the rule.20
The idea that these situations should be analyzed in terms of prima
facie, rather than absolute or conclusive, -obligation may seem more
congenial if we look at an analogous case in moral philosophy. To
the extent that one may speak of moral rules and of validity in moral
contexts, most would agree that there are valid moral rules dictating
that we keep our promises and not tell lies. In some cases both rules
19. I am concerned here with the difference between whether a rule is applicable
or actually applied. For the different but in some respects analogous distinction between
whether a rule is applicable and whether it should be applied, see Note, Understanding
the Model of Rules: Toward a Reconciliation of Dworldn and Positivism, 81 YALE L.J.
912. 917-21 (1972).
20. This latter point cannot be argued further here. For recent papers offering
analyses generally compatible, though not necessarily identical, with that tentatively
suggested in the text, see, e.g., Kadish & Kadish, On lustified Rule Departures by
Officials, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 905 (1971); Note, Understanding the Model of Rules: To.
ward a Reconciliation of Dworkin and Positivism, 81 YALE L.J. 912, 917-21 (1972).
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may be applicable and will thus conflict. Suppose, for example, that
I have promised a friend to tell the police that he is in San Francisco
even though he is, as I am well aware, in Boston. I can keep my
promise only by telling a lie and can tell the truth only by breaking
my promise. Many philosophers would analyze this as a case of con-
flicting prima facie obligations, and whether one obligation or the
other should be overridden will depend on such matters as the con-
sequences of complying with one rule rather than the other.
Under the concept of legal validity described above, there is nothing
to prevent valid legal rules from coming into conflict. A rule is "le-
gally strong or adequate" or "sufficient in point of law" if it has
satisfied the appropriate criteria of validity and no subsequent event,
e.g., a legislative act, has terminated its validity. The observation that
legal validity requires the satisfaction of criteria does not preclude
conflict. For there is nothing in the bare notion of satisfying criteria
that excludes the possibility that the set of criteria of validity pos-
sessed by a legal system should prove mutually incompatible in re-
spect of the set of possible rules that might satisfy them. No doubt
it is desirable that they should prove compatible, and no doubt in
practice they normally do. But what is desirable or usually (or even
invariably) the case is insufficient to establish that conflict between
valid rules is logically impossible.
In concluding that the coficept of validity does not show conflicting
valid rules to be logically impossible, I am not appealing to a line
of judicial decisions that has reached precisely this conclusion. But
it is not merely for reasons of theoretical simplicity or elegance or
convenience that I take the concept of validity not to preclude legal
conflict. For it seems to me that a proper understanding of some
of the more general features of the notion of validity used by judges,
lawyers, and others also compels us to reach this conclusion. And I
shall shortly argue that any theory holding conflict between valid
rules to be logically impossible must run afoul of certain prominent
features of our ordinary notion of validity.
The conclusion that valid rules may conflict does not dictate what
legal consequences will ensue. If there is such a conflict, it logically
follows that the norm-subject cannot jointly conform to both and
that a judge cannot simultaneously apply both in deciding a case.
Whether after a decision in such a case both rules can survive as
valid rules of the system depends, not or not merely on the logic of
"validity," but on the characteristics of the adjudicative practice and
judicial system in question. If an adjudicative practice does not have
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a doctrine of precedent, nothing logically prevents both rules from
continuing to be valid, with their range of application unaltered.
Even where stare decisis is a feature of an adjudicative practice, the
consequences are far from clear. In the United States, for example,
we find coexisting a dual system of state and federal courts. In each
system there are courts which are subordinate, coordinate, or super-
ordinate vis4--vis other courts within that system; certain types of
lawsuits may be brought in either state or federal court, though in
some instances a suit may be "removed" from one to the other; com-
plex rules exist as to when federal law must be applied in state courts
and state law in federal courts; and, while the Supreme Court stands
as the final arbiter, appeal to it is not always legally possible, and
in most cases the Court may and generally does exercise its discretion
not to review a decision of a lower court. If we take stare decisis to
mean that a decision in one court must be followed in relevantly
similar future cases by courts on which its decision is controlling, we
see at once that in the United States the consequences of a decision
actually to apply one of two conflicting valid rules is a rather com-
plicated matter. A court's decision may leave both rules valid in
other parts of the United States judicial system and indeed may co-
exist with a decision to precisely the opposite effect by some other
court within that system. A decision not to apply an applicable and
valid rule, then, does not have as many logical consequences as may
be supposed, and its other consequences depend on whether the doc-
trine of precedent is accepted and on the nature and structure of
the judicial system in question.
B. Defects of a Conclusory Notion of Validity
The previous section sets out my chief reasons for rejecting the
view that the concept of validity itself excludes the possibility of legal
conflict. But it is useful to consider in more detail the alternative that
the notion of legal duty associated with the concept of validity is con-
clusive, that the legal official's obligation to apply a valid legal rule
can never be overridden. This alternative does not inevitably lead to
the conclusion that valid legal rules cannot conflict. One might say
that in cases of conflict an official has an absolute, indefeasible duty
to apply two incompatible rules, and so is in a situation where he
can do nothing right. Though not logically inconsistent, this position
is nevertheless implausible and unpalatable because we would not
think of conflicts-even irreconcilable conflicts-in this way. If a con-
flict arose that the legal system were incompetent to resolve, we would
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usually feel that any official faced with a decision would somehow
have it within his discretion to settle matters as best he could. For
this reason I think that most who are willing to embrace the alterna-
tive being considered would, at least as to the overwhelming number
of cases in which the system has not explicitly deprived the official
of the discretion necessary to come to hi decision, adopt a different
position. They would say that this absolute concept of obligation
leads to a conclusoiy notion of validity and hence that conflicting valid
rules are logically impossible. On this view, a decision not to apply
a rule that is applicable is a decision that it is invalid. As we shall
see, this position seems to be that taken by Dworkin and possibly by
Kelsen.21
I cannot "prove" that the conclusory notion of validity is "wrong."
The concept of legal validity is perhaps not so sharp and clear as to
make the conclusory notion patently silly. Further, to some degree a
philosopher can be master of his words and stipulate that a term is
to bear a certain meaning. Yet, though "validity" is not a term of
art like "fee tail" or "adjusted gross income," it is by no means ex-
clusively or even predominantly a theorist's concept. It is rather part
of our ordinary legal currency. To be persuasive the conclusory no-
tion must elucidate the general understanding of validity possessed
by lawyers and others. But in at least three respects it fails to do so.
First, the conclusory notion separates from the ordinary concept of
legal validity one of its most distinctive features. I refer here to the
fact that something is valid if, and only if, it satisfies criteria set out
elsewhere in the legal system. Judges, lawyers, legal writers, and
others are often concerned with detailing the requirements that a
legal rule, act in the law, or legal instrument must meet to be valid.22
This feature of the ordinary employment of validity cannot be part
of the conclusory notion of validity; for, since there is no assurance
that the criteria relating to what we normally call validity must prove
mutually compatible in respect of the rules meeting them, conflict-
ing rules might satisfy them. It would therefore be logically incon-
sistent to say both (i) that validity turns on the satisfaction of criteria
and (ii) that validity is conclusory in the sense explained. And it is
a mistake to jettison (i) rather than (ii), because (i) together with an
account of valid rules in terms of a prima facie legal obligation on
legal officials, preserves and elucidates the way in which the par-
ticipants in a legal system think of validity, while (ii) does not.
21. See pp. 1156-68 infra.
22. See, e.g., the general criteria set for a valid marrant in REsTATF% ET (SEco.,D) or
ToRS § 123 (1965).
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Second, the conclusory notion of validity would construe legal
"strength" or "adequacy" or "sufficiency" in a dubious way. If validity
is both conclusory and elucidatory in these terms, they must also be
given a conclusory, absolutist sense. Thus if a rule is valid, its strength,
adequacy, or sufficiency would preclude its application ever being de-
feated or overridden. It does not seem to me that many lawyers would
be altogether happy with this reading. For example, many would say
that the notion of strength clearly admits of degree in some fashion.
If something is strong, that does not prevent something else from
overriding it. Roughly the same point holds, though less obviously,
in the case of adequacy and sufficiency. Adequacy is generally used
in legal contexts to mean fully equal to legal requirements or occa-
sions.23 This accords with its more general employment to cover what-
ever is commensurate or equal to what is required or fitting.24 But
this hardly prevents something else from being adequate as well. The
word "sufficiency," when it does not bear simply the same meaning
as "adequacy, ' 2 5 is often used in a prima facie way that allows that
something which is sufficient may be surpassed or overridden.2 0 The
conclusory notion of validity, unlike the concept of legal validity I
have argued for, thus disables us from entertaining interpretations in
line with the common usage of these terms.
In reply, it might be urged that at least sometimes the courts have
used "validity" in a conclusory sense. I concede that judges have oc-
casionally used "validity" in a way that is arguably conclusory. A
closer consideration of their opinions, however, reveals that they were
intending, not to oppose the concept of validity defended here, but
to distinguish validity from some other concept. Although a review
of every relevant case is hardly possible, an example will help to make
my point clearer. The language of Sharpleigh v. Surdam27-a decision
often cited by courts wrestling with the meaning of "validity"-is
stronger than any I have encountered. The issue there was whether
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 425, 59
A. 961, 981 (1904) ("adequate" means "fully equal to requirements or occasions'). A
few courts have apparently used the word "adequate" less stringently. See Eaton v.
Patterson, 2 Stew. & P. 9, 19 (Ala. 1832); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 187 Kan. 599, 605,
358 P.2d 776, 781 (1961); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 96 Kan. 591, 595, 152 P. 657, 659
(1915).
24. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTONARY (1933), s.v. "adequate." The word Is derived
from the Latin verb adaequare, meaning "to make or become level or equal."
25. See, e.g., People v. Kiser, 112 Car. App. 2d 903, 905, 245 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1952)
("adequate" means "fully sufficient").
26. See, e.g., Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 137, 141-42 (1855) ("sufficient" in
Arkansas statute is a synonym for "prima facie," not "conclusive'); State v. Newton,
33 Ark. 276, 284 (1878) ("sufficient" means "prima facie"). See also Note, Causation
and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 136 (1970).
27. 21 F. Cas. 1173 (No. 12,711) (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1876).
1154
Vol. 82: 1140, 1973
Validity and Legal Conflicts
a tax sale was valid or not. The applicable statute provided that only
proof of certain facts could invalidate the sale, and the question was
whether "irregularities"-i.e., a variety of technical defects in the sale
procedure not mentioned in the statute-would render the sale in-
valid. In answering this question in the negative, the court said
that "validity" means "legal sufficiency and complete obligation";
anything "valid" is "in a plenary sense lawful and indefeasible."28
The context in which these remarks were made, however, discloses
that the court was concerned to distinguish the concept of validity
from that of regularity. "Regularity" is a technical term used by
lawyers in connection with the rather formal aspects of a practice
or proceeding. A tax sale, for instance, would be considered "regu-
lar" if the sale were properly advertised, the officer in charge sold
the property to the highest bidder, and so on. "Validity," on the
other hand, concerns more than these formal requirements. A tax
sale might be "regular" in every way, yet "invalid" if, for example,
the officer purporting to sell the property did not have the legal
power to do so because his commission had expired. It was this dis-
tinction between validity and regularity that exercised the court in
Sharpleigh.2 9 The court did not face the philosophical question of
whether there can be two conflicting rules applicable to a given
situation, each of which satisfies the relevant criteria of validity.
Third, the conclusory notion of validity would compel us to con-
flate considetations of a quite disparate character in making assess-
ments under the rubric of validity. Determining whether a rule is
valid would, on the conclusory notion, involve deciding both (i)
whether the rule satisfies the criteria relating to rules of its type and
(ii) whether certain rather special considerations defeat the appli-
cation of an otherwise applicable and valid rule. Only (i) is properly
a matter of validity. Hence, to run these typically disparate decisions
together under the heading of assessments of validity is to obscure
their distinct character. Now I would grant that, in some cases, de-
ciding whether a rule satisfies the appropriate criteria of validity may
be nearly as difficult as deciding whether special considerations de-
feat its application. For example, the validity of laws in the United
States relating to religion or to the exercise of free speech is often
dependent on constitutional provisions having a long and tortured
history of judicial interpretation. Determining whether laws of this
type are valid may call for all the powers of judgment possessed by
28. Id. at 1178, 1179.
29. The court in fact well illustrates the distinction. Id. at 1178-79.
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the wisest court. But this does not justify conflating (i) and (ii). For
even if the issues in some extremely difficult cases may go to validity,
they do not do so in all or even most cases. This is a simple point,
but nonetheless fundamental, as it relates importantly to the way
we think of validity. Suppose, for example, that we have concluded
that a penal statute satisfies the applicable criteria of validity and
that a certain person falls within its range of application. Suppose
further, however, that we feel that powerful considerations militate
against applying the statute to him. If so, we are not asking if the
statute is valid. We are rather considering whether it should, on
balance, be applied to this person. The case may prove most in-
tractable, but it would be a distortion to portray this as anxious de-
liberation over the validity of the statute. As a general matter, what
is fundamentally at issue in many difficult cases is something other
than validity. If that is correct, it would count against the conclusory
notion of validity, which would require us to reach just the op-
posite conclusion.
Proponents of the conclusory notion of validity might, I suppose,
argue that they never wished to deny that two valid conflicting rules
could be applicable to a situation, only that a judge could ever ac-
tually apply two such rules simultaneously in the same case. But if
this is all the conclusory notion of validity means, its interest evap-
orates. Of course a judge could never actually apply two conflicting
rules to the same case. Just as joint conformity to two conflicting
rules is a logical impossibility, so is their joint application by a legal
official. But this has nothing to do with validity. The same would
hold if only one, or if neither, of the rules were valid. The reason
that two conflicting valid rules cannot both be actually applied turns
solely on the fact that they conflict. But to say that this is all that is
at issue is to ignore the root question-whether two conflicting valid
legal rules can both be applicable to the same situation.
C. Dworkin and Kelsen on Validity
1. Dworkin: Conflict and Obligation
It is useful to inquire, in some more directly textual fashion,
whether on some defensible account of validity conflicts might be
precluded. The account offered in passing by Dworkin in his in-
teresting and valuable essay, The Model of Rules, which emerges
in the context of his distinction between rules and principles, does
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not allow conflicting but valid legal rules. "Rules are applicable in
an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be
accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the de-
cision."30 Principles, on the other hand, have a dimension of "weight"
and may conflict. "But we cannot say that one rule is more im-
portant than another within the system of rules, so that when two
rules conflict one supersedes the other by virtue of its greater weight.
If two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid rule."31 By con-
trast, it is said to be "odd to speak of a principle as being valid at
all, perhaps because validity is an all-or-nothing concept, appropriate
for rules, but inconsistent with a principle's dimension of weight."32
It is difficult, I think, to ascertain exactly what is being said here."3
These passages seem to be directed at showing, or at least stating ac-
curately, that our ordinary concept of validity excludes the possi-
bility of conflicting yet valid rules. But if so the discussion is vitiated
by two central mistakes. In the first place, these passages partially
conflate, or misconceive the relation between, the quite distinct con-
cepts of the validity and the applicability of standards. Consider, for in-
stance, the rule that all male United States citizens must register with
the Selective Service System after reaching their eighteenth birthday.34
This rule is valid if, and only if, it satisfies certain criteria set out
elsewhere in the system; it must, for example, be promulgated by
the Director of Selective Service in a way determined by and within
the limits of the Universal Military Training Act. The rule in ques-
30. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 1, at 37.
31. Id. at 40.
32. Id. at 55.
33. The difficulty is compounded by Dworkin's most recent discussion of conflicts in
Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 882-88 (1972), whose relation to the
views put forward in his earlier essay is not entirely dear. On the one hand, he appears
to be partly engaged in a defense of his earlier views on legal conflicts; certainly at
no point does he explicitly retract them. On the other, some of his language suggests
that his position is now less firm: "I did not deny, in my original artcle, that con-
flicts in rules might exist. I said that in our legal system such conflicts would be oc-
casions of emergency, occasions requiring a decision that would alter the set of standards
in some dramatic way." Id. at 883-84. At least part of this I can accept. I agree that
legal conflicts are emergencies, though in my opinion whether a decision would alter
the standards in question depends on whether the legal system accepts the doctrine of
precedent, and even if so to what extent those standards would be altered in the system
as a whole turns on the structure of the judicial system in question. It may be that in
this passage Dworkin is chiefly concerned to allow that moral rules may conflict, and
that even if legal rules do conflict the conflict is considered resolvable. In an) case,
it should be observed that in this most recent essay he focuses, not on whether there
are irreconcilable conflicts between valid legal rules, but on whether two rules should
be understood to be in conflict when one plainly has the force of an exception to the
other, see id. at 884-87. For this reason, I shall here concentrate on the philosophical
merits of the position outlined in The Model of Rules.
34. 32 C.F.R. § 1611.1(a) (1972).
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tion is applicable to a given case, however, if, and only if, the situa-
tion or circumstances referred to by the rule obtain, i.e., if, and only
if, the person before the court was at the time of the alleged violation
a male United States citizen who had attained the age of eighteen.
A rule may be valid without being applicable; even in a close case,
the decision that a rule is not applicable in a given situation does
not entail that it is invalid. 35 It is thus plain that validity and appli-
cability are two distinct concepts. The first of the passages quoted
earlier 36 nonetheless seems in some measure to run them together.
While Dworkin may in most respects attend to the distinction be-
tween validity and applicability, he does not do so insofar as he fails
to observe with sufficient precision the difference between validity
and defeasibility of application. The assertion that rules are "appli-
cable in an all-or-nothing fashion" should be distinguished both from
the statement that validity is an "all-or-nothing concept" and from
the consequences of the applicability of a rule. That assertion might
mean that applicability does not admit of degree, in which case noth-
ing is said about the possibility of conflict between valid rules. On
the other hand, it might mean that if a rule is applicable it must be
applied. But if so, no support is offered for it, though the idea that
rules cannot have weight seems to be invoked without argument.
Secondly, Dworkin's account interpreted in this way also misap-
prehends the relation between validity and weight in that it takes
them to be mutually inapplicable concepts. Whether any given
standard is valid depends on whether it satisfies certain criteria set
out elsewhere in the legal system. So long as it is possible to separate
in any way what is law from what is not, we may distinguish between
valid and invalid standards. By contrast, whether any given standard
has weight turns on whether, if that standard comes into conflict
with another,31 the former's importance or centrality, and also the
consequences of applying it or not, are relevant in deciding which
standard to employ. Validity and weight are thus distinct concepts,
though this does not in itself mean that one could never apply both
concepts to the same item. It is said that "validity is an all-or-nothing
35. Of course, courts sometimes decide the applicability of a rule partly according to
considerations of validity. Thus the applicability of a law may be construed narrowly
so as not to render it of dubious constitutionality. An example of this may perhaps be
found in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
36. See p. 1157 supra.
37. This clause is not a petitio principii, for I am not here asserting that rules con-
flict, only that for any standards which do conflict we determine whether they have
weight by seeing how they behave in such instances. If such factors as the centrality of
a standard then come into play, it has "weight."
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concept, appropriate for rules, but inconsistent with a principle's di-
mension of weight." But this is a non sequitur. The concept of validi-
ty, it may be conceded, does not admit of degree.38 But it hardly fol-
lows that everything of which the word "valid" may be predicated
cannot have different degrees of importance.39 It therefore does not
follow either that rules cannot have weight or that anything in the
concept of validity precludes its application to principles as well as
rules. Consequently, nothing in the concept of validity has been shown
to eliminate the possibility of conflicting yet valid rules.
The above criticisms hold against what seems to me one plausible
interpretation of these passages. Yet, as Dworkin has pointed out to
me in conversation, it is not exactly in this way that he wishes to
be understood. The passages quoted are not attempting to prove that
conflict between valid rules is impossible. They are concerned only
38. This statement may need several minor qualifications. First, the concept of validity
does not preclude that some considerations may override the application of an other-
wise applicable valid rule in certain circumstances. See pp. 1150-52 supra. Second.
writers sometimes, though perhaps misleadingly, use the expression "relative Validity"
to cover the situation in which one rule repeals or derogates, in whole or in part, the
validity of another rule with which it conflicts. For an exam pIe of this use., see TE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 507 (Modern Library ed. E. Earle intro. 1937) (A. Hamilton). Neither
of these qualifications, of course, is inconsistent with the idea that validity does not
itself admit of degree.
But if validity does not admit of degree, it may be wondered whether there is some
confusion in explaining it in terms of legal "strength" or "adequacy" or "sufficiency."
The concepts of strength and probably adequacy, though perhaps not that of sufficiency,
do in ordinary contexts admit of degree. Certainly it is commonplace to say that some-
thing is "stronger," and probably also that it is "more adequate," than another. Of
course some arguments could be presented in defense of the law here. One would be
that such degree as may pertain to the concepts of legal strength or adequacy is simply
a reflection of the two points mentioned in the preceding paragraph. A subtler, and
perhaps more plausible, argument begins from the thought that legal validity and legal
strength or adequacy are not extensionally equivalent concepts. That is, while everything
valid is legally strong or adequate, not everything legally strong or adequate is valid.
What this argument invokes is the limited force the law at times bestows on rules
or acts in the law or legal instruments that are voidable or even void. A prominent ex-
ample here would be the requirement that an injunction issuing from a court having
jurisdiction be obeyed, even if invalid, until dissolved or reversed on appeal by a higher
court. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 US. 181 (1922). The point
of this example is that even though the injunction does not satisfy the criteria of -alidity
set by the system, it nonetheless possesses legal strength or adequacy in the sense that
it must be obeyed until dissolved or reversed. The argument concludes by saying that
everything valid possesses legal strength or adequacy to the same degree. but that there
is a lower degree, or perhaps several lower degrees, of strength or adequacy which may
be possessed by things that are not valid. While I would not contend that there is nothing
in these two arguments, I am not confident that they free the language of some courts
entirely of confusion. On occasion a judge may cite a dictionary definition without fully
reflecting on the ways in which that definition may be misleading in a legal context.
See, e.-., State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of LeFlore County, 177 Okla. 470, 477, 60 P.2d
788, 795 (1936). In any case, the present article and my monograph should be under-
stood to embrace the elucidation of legal validity in terms of legal strength or adequacy
only to the extent that that explanation is purged of any lingering confusion as to
the admission of degree.
39. This applies to importance generally, not merely to what Dworkin calls "func-
tional importance." See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 1, at 39.
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to list a variety of differences between validity and weight, rules and
principles, as Dworkin conceives them. That validity is an "all-or-
nothing concept" does not, or does not merely, mean that it fails to
admit of degree; the idea is that it settles a question of legal duty.
The remarks about validity and weight are intended to point to a
functional similarity between the two concepts: Validity is to rules
as weight is to principles. That is, validity is a concept we apply
only to rules, and if a rule is valid it "dictate[s] [a] result, come what
may,"40 i.e., settles a question of legal duty. Weight is a concept we
apply only to principles, and the amount of influence a principle has
is proportional to its weight.41 It is perhaps true that Dworkin's posi-
tion thus elucidated incorporates some features of the interpretation
arrived at earlier simply by textual exegesis. The salient feature of
this new interpretation or position, however, is that it seems to rest
more explicitly on the assumption that the notions of legal obliga-
tion and legal validity jointly operate to preclude the existence of
conflicting valid rules.
A full investigation of all the questions raised by this position can-
not be attempted here, and I shall restrict myself to two points con-
cerning validity. First, the passages from The Model of Rules, so
interpreted, will readily be seen to embrace the conclusory notion
of validity we considered at length above and rejected for reasons that
do not need to be rehearsed. 42 Second, Dworkin's particular theory
is open to an additional objection. I have contented myself above
with the observation that Dworkin does not prove that the concept
of validity is logically inapplicable to principles.43 I shall now sug-
gest, and in some measure attempt to show, that the opposite is true
-viz. that our ordinary concept of validity is applicable to principles.
That concept is applicable both to items, such as legal rules, that
may have application in more than one set of circumstances, and to
items, like acts in the law or legal instruments, that are tied to a
40. Id. at 49.
41. Dworkin usually says that a principle cannot dictate a result; for example, "It
states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular de-
cision." Id. at 38. But in one passage he writes that "a set of principles can dictate
a result," though this does not mean that they can do so "come what may"-only rules
can do that. Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). I shall not here inquire whether the putative
distinction between "dictating a result" and "dictating a result, come what may" Is
altogether clear and coherent.
42. See pp. 1152-56 supra.
43. See p. 1159 supra. Dworkin's language sometimes suggests that it would only
be a linguistic irregularity to refer to the validity of a principle ("[i]t seems odd to
speak of a principle as being valid at all . . ."), but at others it invokes the idea that
the concept of validity is logically inapplicable to principles ("validity is . . . incon-
sistent with a principle's dimension of weight"). Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra
note 1, at 55 (emphasis added). I am here concerned only with the latter position.
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unique situation. Of items of the former type we say that they are,
or are not, "members" of a legal system, though we rarely if ever
make such an assertion in regard to items of the latter type. This
fact may be stated more rigorously in this way: An item of the first
type is a "member" of a legal system if, and only if, it satisfies the
criteria of validity in that system. The point of asserting that such
an item is valid is sometimes that it belongs to the legal system re-
ferred to. The point of the corresponding denial is sometimes that
it does not belong to that system and perhaps not to any legal system.
Now legal principles, if they exist at all, are items of the first type;
like legal rules, they have potential application to different situa-
tions. For this reason we sometimes are concerned to say and to
establish that a given principle is or is not a member of a particular
legal system. And in those circumstances we would also say and try
to establish that it is or is not valid. If so, our ordinary concept of
validity is, pace Dworkin, indeed applicable to principles. 4" The con-
clusory notion of validity therefore diverges from it once more and
so again fails to elucidate our usual employment of the concept.
The conclusion that the concept of validity is applicable to legal
principles might be attacked on the ground that it is incompatible
with the way "valid" is often used in legal contexts. Many courts
have said that if something is "valid" then it cannot legally be "ig-
nored" or "overthrown"; yet it belongs to the very nature of a prin-
ciple that it can be "ignored" or "overthrown." Again, insofar as
validity is tied to obligation, it must be noted that while a principle
may have great weight it cannot dispositively impose an obligation.
This attack fails, I believe, because it does not pay sufficient attention
to the way in which the courts use such terms. To my knowledge,
assertions to the effect that something valid cannot legally be "ig-
nored" or "overthrown" occur in judicial opinions only when courts
are concerned with legal rules or with items such as judicial orders
which can be given some plausible paraphrase in terms of legal rules.
To "ignore" or "overthrow" a legal rule or judicial order, in the
sense of declining to apply it, would in most situations in which it
is applicable be to deprive it of its vitality. This is not so at all in
the case of legal principles. Declining to apply a principle does not
44. One possible line of reply to this argument is to say that while our usual concept
of validity is applicable to our ordinary understanding of principles and to some thc-
oretical accounts of them, it is not applicable to Dworhinian principles. This reply does
not seem to me very promising, as it only pushes the difficulties off onto a (resultingl))
queer notion of principles wifhout rescuing the conclusory notion of validity generally.
I shall therefore not consider it here.
1161
The Yale Law Journal
spell its demise, for by definition the application of a principle may
be defeated when it has less weight than a competing principle. In
regard to the relation between validity and obligation, we must be
careful to distinguish between (i) the obligation (if any) imposed on
private persons and (ii) the obligation imposed on a legal official by
a principle. As to the former, I would not of course claim that a
principle imposes an obligation in Dworkin's sense of "dictating a
result." A power-conferring or permissive principle imposes no ob-
ligation at all; a principle of obligation imposes an obligation only
to the extent that it is not overridden by competing principles. So
far as the latter is concerned, however, a legal official does have an
obligation to give a principle its appropriate weight. By this route
we can see how the notion of validity is applicable to principles. A
principle, if valid, may not be "ignored" or "overthrown" in the
sense that a court can consistently fail to give it appropriate weight.
Should such a failure consistently occur, the principle would indeed
ultimately lose its validity. On the other hand, a valid and applicable
legal rule, unlike a valid legal principle, would in most legal systems
generally lose its vitality immediately if a court declined to apply
it. This difference does not mean that the concept of validity is in-
applicable to principles. It merely underscores in a special context
the difference between rules and principles.
2. Kelsen: Conflict and Logical Consistency
I turn now to a second position, taken on some occasions by Kelsen,
according to which valid norms may not conflict. Kelsen does not
always subscribe to this view. Some passages in his writings construe
validity not to preclude conflict; 4" and in several fairly recent ar-
ticles he has stated, without much elaboration, that legal norms of
the same system may conflict. 4" But at other times he has taken the
45. See, e.g., PuRE THEORY OF LAw 18 (M. Knight transl. 1967): "The validity of a
norm according to which a certain behavior ought to be . . . does not exclude tile pos-
sibility of the validity of a norm according to which the opposite behavior ought to
be." This passage is not, however, wholly free of textual difficulty. The paragraph ill
which the words quoted appear concludes in the German with a sentence that seriously
qualifies, if it does not repudiate, the former: "Man kann die eine oder die andere
Norm (aber nicht die beide zugleich) als giiltig ansehen." REINE REcusTsLEHlE 18 (2d Cd.
1960). (My translation: "One can regard one norm or the other (but not both at the
same time) as valid.') This sentence was omitted by the translator, though it was duly
rendered in the French translation (also approved by Kelsen), THFORIE PURE DU DROIT
25 (C. Eisenmann transl. 1962), as follows: "On pett considrer comme valable solt l'une
soit l'autre norme; ii est par contre impossible de les consid6rer comme valables et l'une
et l'autre A ]a fois."
46. See Kelsen, Die Grundlage der Naturrechtslehre, 13 OESTERREICHISCHIE ZEITsCilIHuFT
FUER OEFFENTLICnES RECHT 1, 2-4 (1963); Kelsen, Derogation, in ESSAYS IN JURISt'RUDENCE IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 339, 351 (R. Newman ed. 1962).
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opposite position, and it is with it alone that I shall be concerned
here. Thus, Kelsen writes that a "system of norms can only be valid
if the validity of all other systems of norms with the same sphere of
validity has been excluded."47 Similarly, in discussing the relation
between law and morals, Kelsen says that "an individual who regards
the law as a system of valid norms has to disregard morals as such a
system .... [N]o viewpoint exists from which both morals and law
may simultaneously be regarded as valid normative orders. No one
can serve two masters." 48
How are these remarks to be understood? It might be said that
Kelsen is pointing to a problem about obligation: that two valid
norms cannot impose duties that are both incompatible and inde-
feasible. Dworkin, for example, has suggested that Kelsen's "concern
is with the dynamics of legal reasoning . . . Kelsen's view is that
one person cannot regard both norms as valid in the sense of de-
ciding the issue of what he ought to do on some occasion."40 Beyond
the fact that much of what Dworkin ascribes to Kelsen, e.g., concern
with the dynamics of legal reasoning, seems more akin to Dworkin's
thought than Kelsen's, this interpretation is ambiguous and does not
in any case settle the issue. On the one hand, if Dworkin is con-
struing Kelsen to say that since guidance cannot be taken from each
of two conflicting norms, only one can be valid, Kelsen is saddled
with the conclusory notion of validity that we have earlier con-
sidered and rejected. For that connection would hold only if the
application of valid norms necessarily cannot be overridden. On the
other, if Dworkin is reading Kelsen to say that since only one of
two conflicting norms can be valid, guidance cannot be taken from
both, Kelsen is consigned to begging the question. In either case, the
position ascribed to Kelsen is rife with confusion. It is true that if
47. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 410 (1945).
48. H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAw 329 (1967). It is perhaps not absolutely dear that.
even in his books, Kelsen denies the possibility of conflicting valid norms within the same
legal system. For example, the passage from which a sentence was just quoted from General
Theory of Law and State at text accompanying note 47 supra is centrally concerned with
putative conflict between law and morals. While the sentence I have reproduced is certainly
broad enough to cover (and so deny the possibility of) conflict of valid norms within a le-
gal system, it could certainly be argued that read in context it should not be so construed.
The same argument could be made in connection with the sentence just quoted from
Pure Theory of Law. But cf. id. at 74; GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, supra note
47, at 375. See also note 45 supra.
49. Dworkin, Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine, supra note 1, at 201. Dworkin
is not very clear as to whether this second position is a conceptual one. Though he once
refers to it as a "notion of validity," id. at 201, he also describes it as an "anal 'sis of
validity," id., and earlier remarks that the word "validity" is being used "with different
implications," id. at 200. In the interest of simplicity I shall construe Kelsen as being
concerned with a concept of validity or the meaning of "validity," as I think that my
criticisms can easily be recast to cover variant ways of stating this position.
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two norms conflict a person cannot simultaneously conform to both
of them. So, in one sense at least,50 it is correct to say that a per-
son cannot take guidance from both norms "in the sense of deciding
the issue of what he ought to do on some occasion." But it is a con-
fusion to think that this has anything to do with validity. As argued
above, guidance cannot in this respect be taken from both norms
simply because the norms conflict, not because only one can be valid. t
Thus, even if Dworkin's interpretation of Kelsen is correct, it is
hardly a satisfactory theory of why the concept of validity should
exclude conflict between valid legal norms.
I would suggest that Kelsen be read in quite a different way. He
should be understood as saying that conflicting norms are logically
inconsistent and that the concept of validity is such as to exclude
the possibility of conflicting norms that are valid. Several points
support this interpretation. First, some passages in Kelsen's General
Theory of Law and State52 and Pure Theory of Law"a assimilate
conflicts of norms to logical contradictions. Second, when Kelsen later
abandoned the idea that valid norms cannot conflict, he apparently did
so on the ground that "a conflict between norms is not a logical con-
tradiction and cannot even be compared to a logical contradiction.""
Third, Hart has advanced a plausible interpretation of Kelsen, more
specific in certain respects than that put forward here, which also
rests on a point about logical consistency. Hart writes that "Kelsen's
claim that there can only be one system of valid laws resembles Kant's
claim that there is only one space . . . . I have the impression that
underlying Kelsen's theory of law there is the assumption that there
is a single 'normative space' which must be describable by a consistent
set of rules in a descriptive sense."", The reference here is to Kant's
idea that "we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we
speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the
same unique space."G Although I am not aware of anything that ex-
plicitly confirms or falsifies Hart's suggested interpretation, it seems to
50. This is true if taking "guidance" from a norm means obeying it. But it is perhaps
not true if to take "guidance" from a norm is to consider not only what the norm re-
quires but also the importance of a norm, the consequences of following it or not, and
whether any norms requiring an incompatible course of behavior also apply. This latter
construction leads us to the question whether rules can have weight.
51. See p. 1156 supra.
52. See, e.g., at 374-75.
53. See, e.g., at 74.
54. Kelsen, Derogation, in EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR Or ROSCOE I'oUND 339,
351 (R. Newman ed. 1962).
55. Hart, supra note 7, at 182 n.32 (197-98) (emphasis in original).
56. I. KANT, CRITIQUE Or PURE REASON A 25/B 39 (N. Kemp Smith transl. 1929).
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me consonant with what Kelsen says and with the Kantian overtones in
Kelsen's work generally.
But two conflicting rules or norms need not be considered logi-
cally inconsistent. Hence, nothing in the concept of validity pre-
cludes such conflicts.57 It is, of course, true that on many accounts
of the word "ought" and in many systems of deontic logic, the rules
in a descriptive sense corresponding to Kelsen's "A ought to be" and
"A ought not to be" will be logically inconsistent. We can infer a con-
tradiction if we assume (i) that "ought" implies "can" and (ii) that
"A ought to be" and "A ought not to be" jointly entail "A ought
to be and ought not to be." Using (ii), we can derive "A ought to be
and ought not to be." And, since A cannot both be and not be, we
may employ (i) contrapositively to infer "it is not the case that A
ought to be and ought not to be." A logical inconsistency would
also be present in many systems of deontic logic that are modeled on
alethic modal logics.5 8 So, for instance, an alethic modal logic con-
taining the axiom schema "E] A D A" or some equivalent typically
leads to a deontic system containing the axiom schema "F' A D
-1 ,-, A" or some equivalent. An ordinary language interpretation
of the latter formula would be "it is not the case both that A ought
to be and that A ought not to be." Thus interpreted, this formula
clearly denies that the statements that A ought to be and that A ought
not to be can logically both be true.59
57. In formulating the logical issues involved I have been greatly helped by Lemmon,
Deontic Logic and the Logic of Imperatives, 8 LOiQUE Er ANALYSE 39 (NO. 29) (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Lemmon, Deontic Logic]; Williams, Consistency and Realism, Aiusr.
Soc. SuPP. VOL. XL at 1 (1966); Williams, Ethical Consistency, ARisT. Soc. Sure. VOL
XXXIX at 103 (1965). Other essays of interest in this connection include Lcmmon, Moral
Dilemmas, 71 PHIL. REv. 139 (1962); Lemmon, Is There Only One Correct System of
Modal Logic?, Asusr. Soc. SuPe. VOL. XXXIII at 23 (1959); Prior, The Paradoxes of
Derived Obligation, 63 MIND 64 (1954). The fact that others may dispute their views does
not affect the extremely guarded use I make of their ideas.
There are two responses to Kelsen's position that I shall not pursue here. One is that
even if conflicting rules are logically inconsistent, nothing in the concept of validity, or
any other factor, see note 64 infra, precludes that they should exist in a legal system.
The other response applies to Hart's interpretation of Kelsen: it is that conflicting rules
are not inconsistent if they belong to unrelated normative spaces. Cf. Quinton, Spaces
and Times, 37 PHIL. 130 (1962).
58. Alethic modal logic deals with statements of necessity and possibility. Dontic logic
concerns statements of obligation and permission. In what follows, "r" is the symbol for
necessity in alethic modal logic and for obligation in deontic logic; " 0 " is an abbre-
viation for ",0 [ ,"; the letter "A" in an axiom schema is a metalogical variable rang-
ing over well-formed formulae, though to simplify matters I shall later treat it as also
ranging directly over statements or sentences; ".", "'., and " " are the signs for
truth-functional negation, conjunction, and material implication respectively. An ele-
mentary set of formation rules, axiom schemata, and rules of inference, together with
some appropriate warnings and qualifications concerning the interpretation of symbols,
may be found in Lemmon, Deontic Logic, supra note 57, at 39-51.
59. This formula is also a denial that the statements that A ought to be and that
not-A is permitted can logically both be true, and correspondingly its elimination in
Lemmon's system allows that "([ A & 0 ,., A)" may under some circumstances be
provable.
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Nevertheless, a deontic logic which allows for conflicting obliga-
tions has been suggested by E. J. Lemmon. Q0 In crude outline, this
system eliminates "E] A D ,- E, -, A" as an axiom schema and so
permits that under some circumstances "(LI A 8c E) l A)" will be
provable, i.e., that in some cases A and its opposite will both be ob-
ligatory. Lemmon recognizes that this requires abandonment of the
principle that "ought" always implies "can," and accordingly he col-
lects what seem to me plausible counter-examples to that principle.0 1
But I would not pretend that the situation is clearer than it is. Doubt
rightly exists as to the ordinary language interpretation of the sym-
bols used in deontic logic, as to the extent that any interpretation
captures the character of and logical relations within actual codes
of human behavior, and as to the acceptability of certain conse-
quences of Lemmon's system. It should be plain, however, that some
systems of deontic logic can arguably allow for conflicting obligations,
and that whether such conflicts exist in law, morals, or elsewhere must
be settled by investigation of particular codes or normative systems.
Hence, deontic logic does not rule out the possibility of legal conflicts. 2
It may be objected that a deontic logic which permits conflicting
obligations is of no practical interest. After all, certain systems of
indicative logic allow that under some conditions "(P & , P)" may
be provable; yet, in everyday life, we feel that simultaneously to as-
sert the existence and nonexistence of an empirical fact amounts to
logical contradiction. This objection is unsuccessful. The root issue
is not whether a given system of indicative or deontic logic permits
inconsistent propositions or conflicting obligations respectively, but
whether any such logic can with plausibility be urged to apply re-
spectively to human communication or codes of human behavior.
Let it be granted that some indicative systems allow proof of
"(P & ,-, P)." But it does not follow that there are any plausible cases
of inconsistent assertion. While concededly there are cases where peo-
ple involve themselves in logical inconsistencies of which they are
60. Lemmon, Deontic Logic, supra note 57, at 43-51.
61. Id. at 47-48.
62. It is now possible to clarify the relationship between the logical consistency of
conformity statements and that of rules. See note 8 supra. If we adopt the view that some
sort of alethic modal logic should be made the model of deontic logic and include
"0 A > ,, ] , A" or an equivalent as an axiom schema, then in any case where
the conformity statements corresponding to two duty-imposing rules or to a duty-lm-
posing rule and a permission-granting rule cannot logically both be true, the rules will
also be logically inconsistent. However, even where the conformity statements correspond-
ing to two permissive rules cannot logically both be true, these rules will not be logically
inconsistent, since in no system of deontic logic is "( 4 A & 0 , A)" logically incon-
sistent. If, on the other hand, we adopt a Lemmon-style system of dcontic logic, In none
of these cases will the rules themselves be logically inconsistent.
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unaware, they do not consciously do so in statements of the bald
form "(P & ,-' P)." To take a well-worn example, if in reply to the
question "Is it raining?" someone says "Well, it is and it isn't," we
do not take him to be asserting both that it is raining and that it is
not raining. Rather, we interpret him as indicating a borderline case,
e.g., that it is sleeting or drizzling. If he insists that it is both raining
and not raining, we would earnestly try to convince him that he is
wrong, and, failing that, say that he did not know the meaning of
his words, was schizophrenic, or othenvise incapable of appreciating
that he was contradicting himself. The same is not true with respect
to statements about rules or norms. Contemporary logicians and moral
philosophers of some repute have argued, in discussions dealing with
ordinary moral language and thought, that there may be conflicting
moral obligations and that the conflict may survive our having made
one choice or the other on a particular occasion. It is equally argu-
able that conflicts can exist within a legal system. A deontic logic
allowing for conflicting obligations can thus be urged with more than
superficial plausibility to apply to actual codes of human behavior.
But to this way of dealing with the above objection someone might
make the following rejoinder. If a person is in fact subject to con-
flicting obligations, he should be able to state both that it is, and that
it is not, the case that he has a duty to do A. What is this but a
proposition of the form "(P .-,- P)"? That being so, would we not
interpret his statement, as we did (mutat is mulandis) in the case where
it was said to be both mining and not mining, so as to dissolve the
appearance of conflicting obligation?
This rejoinder is vitiated by two mistakes. First, it may be doubted
whether a statement of conflicting obligations should be rendered by
the indicative formula "(P : , P)" rather than the deontic formula
"(In] A & , ni A)."'03 In either case, it would beg the question, and
is in fact erroneous, to assume that in all systems of indicative and
deontic logic respectively these formulae are self-contradictory. Second,
the rejoinder fatally ignores the context in which a statement of con-
flicting duties is made. It is perhaps true that, as a general matter, if
a person said that he was under obligations to do and not to do an
act, we would interpret what he said so as to render the duties com-
patible. This is because we suppose that by and large normative sys-
63. Strictly speaking, Kelsen's example "A ought to be" and "A ought not to be"
presents, if anything, logical contraries representable by the deontic formula "(Q A &
[] , A)." Contradictortes are presented, if at all, only by "A ought to be" and "it is
not the case that A ought to be" representable in deontic logic by the formula "(Q A
& , [j A)." This technical point has for simplicity's sake been elided in the tCXL
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tems impose mutually compatible obligations. But we would not al-
ways seek such an interpretation. Should he be able to explain in a
convincing way that the rules of the system in question really did
oblige him both to do and not to do the act, we would concede that
there really were conflicting obligations.
Whether there actually are or can be conflicting obligations thus
requires further argument. But it begs the question to define "validi-
ty"-e.g., through axioms of deontic logic which make conflicting
rules logically inconsistent-so as to exclude the possibility of legal
conflict. Whether conflicting valid norms or rules can or do exist
should be settled by the consideration of well-constructed examples
or by reference to the rules of actual legal systems.
III. Conflicting Valid Rules: An Example
Thus far I have argued that there is nothing in the concept of
validity to exclude the possibility of conflicting valid legal rules. Yet
it does not follow that no other factor, e.g., the nature of systems of
civil or criminal procedure, or the concept of a legal system itself,
may preclude that possibility.0 4 Rather than attempt any compen-
dium of the factors that might render conflicts between valid legal
rules impossible, I shall offer an example that shows them to be pos-
sible. Such an example is indeed more difficult to construct than might
be thought. But it is nevertheless possible, and the attempt to construct
it leads to a number of interesting points concerning the nature of law.
It might be suggested that an example of irresolvable conflict can
be produced with great ease.65 Imagine a country with a mature legal
system in which there are two antagonistic religious sects, each a
minority of the population. On a spot held sacred by sect A, there
is a statue of the A's prophet and founder. Sect A persuades the
religiously indifferent population to join them in influencing the na-
tional assembly to enact a penal statute that requires everyone to tip
his hat when passing the prophet's effigy. The statute is, however,
an abomination to sect B, and they persuade the middle group to
support a bill prohibiting idolatry, construed as tipping one's hat to
64. Thus it might be argued that while the concept of validity imports no require-
ment of logical consistency, some other factor does and that conflicting valid rules arelogically inconsistent. Garcia MWynez, Some Considerations on the Problem of Anti-
nomies in the Law, 49 ARclV FUER RECTS- UND SOZIALI'1lLOSO'nllE 1, 4, 7 (1963), seems to
adopt this view. But as we have earlier shown there to be no necessity to regard con-
flicting valid rules as logically inconsistent, the above argument must fail.
65. The example initially produced in the text is an adaptation of one suggested by
Alf Ross in DmEcrIVEs AND NORMS 172-73 (1968).
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the prophet. The A's rally with a rider declaring that the former
statute is to remain in force, and the sect B bill, as amended, is then
duly passed. The country now has two legal rules, one requiring
and the other forbidding people to raise their hats when passing the
prophet's statue. Neither of these two legal rules seems to be invalid;
officials and ordinary citizens alike treat them as the law of the land.
Nor is the law unworkable. Policemen usually avert their eyes, and
prosecutors rarely seek indictments. Cases that do come to trial raise
no special problems for the courts. If an accused has kept his hat on
while passing the statue, a judge will punish him under the former
law; if he has tipped his hat, he is punished under the latter one.
In practice, people usually avoid the site of the statue, and if they
must go near it they simply do not wear a hat.
Yet the briefest consideration of this example reveals a variety of
difficulties which prevents us from seeing it tout court as a case of
irresolvable conflict. First, is it obvious that both statutes are valid?
It is not clear either what the applicable criteria of validity are or
why the statutes meet them. Second, is it plain that the statutes are,
in practice, incompatible? Because people generally avoid the statue
or omit wearing a hat, it might seem that the total effect, if not the
meaning, of the two statutes is simply to impose an obligation to stay
away from the site or to leave one's hat at home-an obligation it is
possible to satisfy. Third, what is to be said of the curious legis-
lative history of the sect B bill? It is often, though not invariably,
said that if two partially or wholly inconsistent statutes are passed at
different times, then the later statute "repeals by implication" the
earlier to the extent of the repugnancy.00 On the other hand, the
rider supported by the A's that "the former statute is to remain in
force" might well be interpreted as reaffirming the vitality of the
earlier statute in such a way that it constitutes an exception to the
sect B bill. Fourth, under what rules of procedure are trials under
either statute conducted? Although in the Anglo-American system
the jury must determine the facts of the case, the judge must instruct
them as to the applicable law. In this example, two conflicting rules
are said to apply, but we are not told how the judge is to frame his
instructions to the jury. It is far from clear that he is not legally
entitled to avoid the difficulty by mentioning only one of the statutes.
66. See, e.g., Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497. 503 (1936); Red Rock v.
Henry, 106 US. 596, 601-02 (1882); King v. Cornell, 106 US. 395, 396 (1882); Henderson's
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 652, 657 (1870); United States v. Tynen, 78 US. (11 WaU.)
88, 92-93 (1870).
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Conceivably, there might be a rule empowering him to dismiss prose-
cutions whenever conflicting rules are applicable to the facts alleged
in the indictment. In sum, while I would not pretend that these
four considerations exhaust the difficulties one might find with this
example, they do indicate that in many legal systems there would
be ample opportunity to reconcile or in some other way deal with
the rules in question. The example does not, then, present a suitable
case of irresolvable conflict.
A satisfactory illustration of conflicting but valid legal rules may
be produced by modifying and expanding the example just discussed
in such a way that the reconciliative devices often available in sys-
tems of adjudication are ruled out. This may be achieved by making
such alterations and adding such details as the following. The legal
system contains rules requiring its citizens to wear hats and to make
monthly visits within twenty feet of the statue. The sect A statute
reads: "Any person passing within twenty feet of the statue of the
prophet must tip his hat." The sect B bill was then enacted with
no rider and provides: "Any person passing within twenty feet of
the statue of the prophet must not tip his hat." The expressions "the
statue" and "the prophet" are used in the two statutes to refer re-
spectively to the same objects, and a number of people while wearing
hats do pass within twenty feet of the prophet's image. Violation of
either of these statutes is a strict liability offense, and the penalty
prescribed for each is ten days in jail, with guilt or innocence to
be decided by the judge without a jury. To be valid, a statute must
be introduced by a member of the national assembly, passed by a
majority of that body, and signed by the premier of the country.
The two statutes satisfy these criteria, and there are no other appli-
cable criteria of validity in the system. Other relevant rules of the
system include: a provision that the doctrine of repeal by implica-
tion is abolished and that statutes which are apparently or actually
in conflict must be read together by the judge in deciding what is
to be the law of the case; a canon of construction to the effect that
only the wording of a statute is to be considered in deciding what
it means and, in particular, that no court is entitled to look to legis-
lative history in interpreting a statute; and sections of the criminal
code which require a policeman witnessing a violation of any law
to report it to the prosecutor, require the prosecutor to indict and
bring to trial any person so accused, permit any defendant or his
counsel to raise the point that two rules of the system are apparently
or actually in conflict, and prohibit the judge from declining to
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take jurisdiction, render judgment, or impose sentence in cases of
apparent or actual conflict.
This, it seems to me, does present a case of irreconcilable conflict.
The rule that all persons passing within twenty feet of the statue
must tip their hats, and the rule prohibiting them from doing so,
are both valid, since they satisfy the applicable criteria of validity
of 'the system. Yet these rules0 7 also conflict, since joint conformity
to two such duty-imposing rules is logically impossible. Further, this
conflict is not resolvable by appeal to rules or principles of the sys-
tem. Suppose that X passed within twenty feet of the statue wearing
a hat, and was observed by a policeman to keep it firmly on his head.
The policeman duly reported this as a violation of the sect A statute
and X was brought to trial. The principles of statutory construction
of the system prevent the judge from saying that no conflict exists,
and he is forbidden to decline jurisdiction. Rather, he has a legal duty
to determine what law governs the case and to render judgment,
though ex hypothesi nothing in the system dictates what he must
decide. What can he do? He has two principal choices: either he
finds X guilty under the first law and sentences him to ten days in
jail, or he finds him not guilty under the second and allows him to
go free. There are a few less plausible choices, some of which might
be permitted under a given adjudicative practice. He could, for ex-
ample, treat the conflicting rules as self-cancelling and adjudge the
defendant not guilty on that basis; he could, as it were, split the
difference and sentence X to five days in jail; he could refuse to
apply either law and invent a third rule; and so on. In any event,
he creates new law at least in deciding the case; if the system accepts
the doctrine of precedent, his decision will be binding in similar
future cases before courts on which his decision is controlling.
This example may be greeted with some suspicion, for it perhaps
pushes very nearly to the limit what our intuitions regarding the
nature of a legal system will allow. By considering a number of ob-
jections to the example, however, I shall try to show that it does
not exceed that limit.
First, one might claim that this situation could never exist in a
legal system. One might, for example, argue that the law could not
regulate human behavior if it admitted of conflicting rules because
citizens could not use such rules in ordering their behavior. Now it
is true that the law could not perform this task if, as a general matter,
67. Although the example in the text may evince conflicts between several pairs of
rules, I shall for simplicity's sake comment on just this one.
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it imposed conflicting obligations on those subject to it. Doubtless
nothing but chaos would result. It does not, however, follow that
in exceptional cases the rules of a stable and workable system could
not conflict. A related argument is that judges would never explicitly
avow that they must go beyond the law for a solution. But this is
irrelevant. We are concerned with what judges do, not with what
they say; with what actually forms the basis of a decision, not i'ith
what is employed in an opinion as a rationalization.
Second, one might object that these two rules were never both
valid. The argument is that a rule is valid or invalid only when a
court has pronounced upon it. Prior to such a pronouncement, we
simply cannot say whether the rule is valid or not. In the example
offered, if X is judged guilty, the sect A law is valid and the sect B
law invalid; if X is acquitted, the situation is reversed. In either
event, the law held to be invalid was, prior to the court's decision,
not merely voidable but rather void, i.e., invalid ab initio. Conse-
quently, there was no time at which the rule not applied was valid,
and hence there were not really two conflicting yet valid rules.
This objection, however, misunderstands the role of criteria of
validity and the use participants in a legal system make of them. Such
criteria enable us to identify laws as valid or invalid by virtue of
certain features or characteristics which they possess or lack. We nor-
mally do not have to wait for a court decision; we usually know that
a rule will be valid if it satisfies certain conditions. 8 Of course there
are close cases in which opinions as to the validity of a rule not yet
upheld by the courts are expressed very tentatively. But our usual
employment of the concept of validity and of criteria of validity is
such that we do not hesitate to say that a given rule is valid or in-
valid (as the case may be). Thus it would be a distortion to suggest
that the sect A law and the sect B law, when both manifestly satisfied
the applicable criteria of validity, existed in a sort of legal limbo.
Though this seems to me sufficient to meet the objection, it is worth
noting that the invocation of the idea of invalidity ab initio in this
68. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 229 (1961) (emphasis In original):
In the simpler form of society we must wait and see whether a rule gets accepted
as a rule or not; in a system with a basic rule of recognition wc can say before a
rule is actually made, that it will be valid if it conforms to the requirements of
the rule of recognition.
It seems to me that this holds in any system which contains criteria of validity. I do
not, however, accept the idea that there must in every legal system be a rule of recog-
nition or some other type of single ultimate rule for deciding questions of validity.
See p. 1174 & note 71 infra.
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context is also far from satisfactory.0 9 It is doubtful that the objec-
tion observes the distinction between what is null or void, i.e., invalid
ab initio, and what is merely voidable as judges, lawyers, and others
purport to draw it. For example, it has been argued that in English
law an act is void if it can be attacked either directly or collaterally,
and voidable if it can be attacked only directly. 0 If so, and if in our
example X had been acquitted under the sect B law, it is plain that
the prosecution could not have attacked the judgment collaterally.
Even if X had been convicted under the sect A law, it is far from
clear that he could have made a collateral attack on the judgment.
So those laws would seem at most to be voidable, not invalid ab initio.
A third, and for our purposes final, objection questions whether
conflicting valid rules are not resolvable within the system after all.
Since a judge or other legal official cannot jointly apply two con-
flicting rules, it would seem that he must somehow make a choice
between them. This objection also fails; for, while it rightly calls
attention to a choice that the legal official must make, it wrongly
concludes that this choice or resolution is necessarily made on the
basis of material within the legal system. First, the resolution may
be effected on the basis of no criteria, rules, or principles whatever.
To say that choosing to apply one rule results from whim or caprice
does not mean that the conflict is in any relevant sense resolved within
the system. Second, even if the official is entitled to and does rely
on certain criteria, rules, or principles, the objecti6n is still not cor-
rect. It may be true that some legal systems contain reconciliative
measures of the sort in question. My point is only that some do not,
and hence that irresolvable conflicts between valid rules may occur
in some legal systems. This point is supported by the facts (a) that
some systems may preclude appeal to any outside means of resolving
conflict; (b) that in others the criteria, rules, or principles to which
appeal is allowable may not invariably be sufficient to resolve con-
flict; (c) that even if they were sufficient, it would not follow that
those criteria, rules, or principles were part of the law and hence
that the reconciliation was actually achieved within the system; and
(d) that there is no guarantee that the criteria, rules, or principles
to which appeal may be had are not themselves ever in irreconcilable
conflict.
69. This is partly a matter of giving any suitable explanation of what it is for some-
thing to be null or void ab initio. See, e.g., H. K. sF, GENa.-,L TitEoRY OF LAw A,m
STATE 160-61 (1945).
70. See A. RUBINSTIN, JURISDICON AND ILLEm.rY: A STUDY iN PuoC L.A', passim(1965).
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IV. Conclusion
Save for one brief point, I cannot here explore the ramifications
of the fact that valid legal rules can conflict. That one point is that
my thesis implies the law to be in one respect not necessarily the
neat and formal structure many legal philosophers have claimed. The
view that legal systems are inescapably tidy and formal is, of course,
a complex one, and perhaps no legal philosopher has ever accepted
it in its entirety. One aspect of that view, for instance, may be found
in theories which hold that every legal system contains a single ulti-
mate rule that welds otherwise unrelated material into a unified
legal order and serves as a touchstone for the validity of all other
laws of the system. However, even if some test exists for separating
what is law from what is not, it must, as I have argued elsewhere, on
any acceptable theory of individuation consist of a plurality of rules.71
Another feature of the view that the law is tidy and formal is dis-
credited if valid legal rules can conflict. The mistake lies in the as-
sumption that, for some logical or quasi-logical reason, compatibility
must obtain in the prohibitions and permissions that the law erects.
The source of this error is the failure to appreciate that law is the
result of human behavior, and in particular of the human acts of
will and decision from which its standards spring. Human behavior,
as we know all too sadly, does not always conform to what is rational.
From pressures swaying legal officials in opposite directions, or out
of human obtuseness or forgetfulness or perversity, laws may gen-
erate commands or permissions applicable to a given situation that
cannot be simultaneously followed or acted upon. The human will
is not so rational or the concept of legal validity so constituted as
to prevent conflicting valid legal rules from coming into existence,
nor is logic in any position to provide such assurance.
71. See S. MUNzER, LEGAL VALImIY 44-69 (1972).
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